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The Pro-Arbitration Policy: Is This
What the Parties Really Intended?
The Courts' Treatment of Forum
Selection Clauses in Arbitration
Agreements
Sterling Financial Inv. Group, Inc. v. Hammer
l
I. INTRODUCTION
In today's global economy, it is not uncommon for parties from different lo-
cations to contract together both in commerce and in employment. Especially in
the context of employers, one party will often want any and all disputes it has with
its employees to be resolved via arbitration in a certain forum. To accomplish
this, employers often include a forum selection clause in the arbitration agree-
ment with the future employee. Thus, if and how courts address forum selection
clauses is of paramount importance to employers. In Sterling Financial Invest-
ment Group, Inc. v. Hammer, the 11 th Circuit Court of Appeals were faced with
the issue of whether to interpret and enforce a forum selection clause in an arbitra-
tion agreement between an employee and an employer. 2
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2001, Sterling Financial Investment Group (Sterling) approached Bernard
Hammer about a possible employment opportunity at Sterling's headquarters in
Boca Raton, Florida.3 At the time, Hammer was working in Beaumont, Texas, as
a stockbroker for Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.4 The two parties spent sev-
eral months negotiating before Hammer took a position as nationwide supervisor
of recruitment of brokers at Sterling. 5 In September 2001, Hammer resigned from
his position at Morgan Stanley Dean Writter & Co., and moved to Boca Raton,
Florida, where he began working for Sterling. 6 Before beginning work with Ster-
ling, Hammer signed an employment agreement. The employment agreement
between Hammer and Sterling contained an arbitration provision. 7
Shortly after his employment commenced at Sterling, Hammer was fired.8
Thereafter, Hammer returned to Texas and, in 2003, began arbitration proceedings
1. 393 F.3d 1223 (11 th Cir. 2004).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1223.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1223-24.
7. Id. at 1224.
8. Id.
1
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against Sterling.9 Hammer asserted breach of contract, fraudulent inducement and
quasi contract, promissory estoppel, and "other claims under statutory and com-
mon law."' 0 Hammer sought to have the arbitration in Houston, Texas, but Ster-
ling objected to Texas venue, demanding that venue be transferred to Florida pur-
suant to the arbitration agreement."
At the start of their employment relationship, Hammer and Sterling had en-
tered into two agreements, a Representative Agreement and an Employment
Agreement. 2  Pertinent provisions of the Employment Agreement stated that
Hammer was an "at will" employee and that the parties were entering into an arbi-
tration agreement.' 3 The arbitration provision contained a forum selection clause
which provided that, "[t]he parties agree that any claim or controversy concerning
the terms, conditions or application of this Agreement shall be subject to arbitra-
tion pursuant to the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. in Boca
Raton, Florida."' 14 The same agreement also contained a clause stating that the
agreement "shall be construed, and the validity, performance and enhancement
thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the State of Florida."'
15
A forum selection clause was also included in the Representative Agree-
ment.' 6 It provided that, "[a]ny disputes between the parties hereto shall be sub-
mitted to binding arbitration before the National Association of Securities Dealers
with venue being in the State of Florida."'17 Similar to the Employment Agree-
ment, the Representative Agreement also contained a provision stating that the
Representative Agreement "shall be construed in accordance with and shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Florida."'
8
Sterling stated, as one of its reasons for firing Hammer, that his performance
was not satisfactory.' 9 In his defense, Hammer asserted that Sterling never clari-
fied what exactly Hammer's position entailed, never related which duties were
his, and failed to provide him with adequate administrative support, such as office
and telephone arrangements.2 °
After being fired, Hammer returned to Texas where he filed his claim against
Sterling with the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).2 ' Pointing













21. Id. The National Association of Securities Dealers serves as "the primary private-sector regula-
tor of America's securities industry... oversee[ing] the activities of more than 5,100 brokerage firms,
approximately 99,000 branch offices and more than 660,000 registered securities representatives."
About NASD, at http://www.nasd.comlweb/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&nodeld=608&
ssSourceNodeld=5 (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). Additionally, the NASD "oversee[s] and regulate[s]
trading in equities, corporate bonds, securities futures and options ... [and] operate the largest securi-
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ceedings be transferred to Florida, but the NASD denied the request." The NASD
then referred the arbitration to a panel in Houston, Texas.23
Seeking to stay arbitration in Texas and have venue transferred to Florida,
Sterling filed a motion in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida.24 Sterling contended that, under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),
the district court had authority to transfer venue to Florida based on the employ-
ment agreements between Hammer and Sterling.2 5 Conversely, Hammer argued
that the federal courts should not attempt to assert control over every detail of
every issue in an arbitration proceeding. 26 Hammer stated that, in this case, arbi-
trators should make all decisions in regards to the arbitration, since both parties
had agreed to arbitration. To support his position, Hammer relied on NASD's
Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 10315, which states that "[t]he Director shall
determine the time and place of the first meeting of the arbitration panel and of the
,,28parties. Rule 10315 also provides that "[tihe arbitrators shall determine the
time and place for all subsequent meetings...,29
Adopting Sterling's argument, the district court granted Sterling's motion to
stay arbitration in Texas and to compel arbitration in Florida. 30 Hammer subse-
quently appealed.3'
The United States Court of Appeals, in the Eleventh Circuit, affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision. 32 The court also adopted Sterling's argument that the FAA
grants the district court authority to enforce the terms of both the Employment and
Representative agreements. 33 The Eleventh Circuit found that, when one party
seeks to have an arbitration commence in a forum inconsistent with a forum selec-
tion clause of a valid arbitration agreement and the arbitrator also disregards the
forum selection clause, the FAA grants a federal district court jurisdiction to in-
terpret and enforce the forum selection clause contained in the arbitration agree-
ment.
34
22. Hammer, 393 F.3d at 1224.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1225.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1224.
28. Id. at 1225. Rule 10315 states:
The Director shall determine the time and place of the first meeting of the arbitration panel and
the parties, whether the first meeting is a pre-hearing conference or a hearing, and shall give no-
tice of the time and place at least 15 business days prior to the date fixed for the first meeting by
personal service, registered or certified mail to each of the parties unless the parties shall, by their
mutual consent, waive the notice provisions under this Rule. The arbitrators shall determine the
time and place for all subsequent meetings, whether the meetings are pre-hearing conferences,
hearings, or any other type of meetings, and shall give notice as the arbitrators may determine.
Attendance at a meeting waives notice thereof.
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure #10315 (2005), at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/
display.html?rbid=l 189&record-id=l 159005609 (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
29. NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure #10315 (2005), at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/diplay/
display.html?rbid=l 189&recordid=l 159005609 (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
30. Hammer, 393 F.3d at 1224.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1226.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was originally enacted in 1925, and later
reenacted and codified as Title IX of the United States Code in 1947. 35 Congress
enacted the FAA in order to place arbitration agreements on an equal level with
ordinary contracts, thereby removing the "longstanding judiciary hostility" to-
wards arbitration agreements at common law.36 Section 2 of the FAA sets forth
this mandate by stating that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revo-
cation of any contract. 3 7 Section 4 of the FAA provides that district courts shall
have the power to issue orders to compel arbitration when one party has failed,
neglected, or refused to arbitrate under a valid arbitration agreement.3 8 Section 4
also requires that if the make of the arbitration agreement or the failure to comply
with the agreement is not an issue, the court shall direct the parties to arbitrate.
Furthermore, if they are found to be in issue, and the trial court determines there
has been a breach of the agreement, the court will order "the parties to proceed to
arbitration" per the terms of their agreement.
39
The Supreme Court has stated that the FAA manifests a "liberal federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration agreements," 4 and that its central purpose is to "ensure
'that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms."'
41
Courts are thus required to "rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate" 42 so that
contractual rights and expectations of the parties are given full effect.43 Any ques-
tions as to whether an issue is arbitrable are to be resolved in favor of arbitration. 44
Arbitration agreements are consensual contracts in which parties are "generally
free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit," so that parties may
"specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted." 45
35. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2000).
36. Id.
37. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
38. 9 U.S.C. § 4. Section 4 provides:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written
agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court .... for an order directing
that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. The court shall hear
the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure
to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Id.
39. Id. Section 4 states:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbi-
tration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.... If the making of
the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court
shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof..., If the jury find that an agreement for arbitration
was made in writing and that there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an
order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms
thereof. Id.
40. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24 (1983).
41. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1995) (citation omitted).
42. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (citation
omitted).
43. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
44. Moses, 460 U.S. at 24-25.
45. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
[Vol. 2
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Consequently, parties may limit what issues they will arbitrate 46 and, by way of a
forum selection clause, where they will arbitrate.47
In cases where one party has either failed, neglected, or refused to arbitrate a
dispute that is subject to an arbitration agreement, section 4 of the FAA grants
district courts the power to issue an order "directing that such arbitration proceed
in the manner provided for in such agreement.'48 Section 4 also provides that
"[tihe hearing and proceedings, under such agreement, shall be within the district
in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed."49 This lan-
guage has been interpreted by various courts to mean that a district court has no
power to order arbitration to take place outside of its own district.
50
At least one other court besides Hammer has relied on section 4's language to
enforce a forum selection clause in an arbitration agreement when one party at-
tempted to start arbitration at a place other than that provided in the agreement.
51
In Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. v. Bennett,52 a customer signed an agreement with asecurities broker-dealer which provided:
[a]ny controversy out of or relating to your account in connection with
transactions between us or pursuant to this agreement thereof shall be set-
tled by arbitration in accordance with the rules, then in effect, of the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., the Board of Governors of
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., or the Board of Governors of the
American Stock Exchange, Inc. [AMEX] as you may elect.
53
Additionally, Article VIII, section 2(c) of the AMEX Constitution states, "if any
of the parties to a controversy is a customer, the customer may elect to arbitrate
before the American Arbitration Association [AAA] in the City of New York,
unless the customer has expressly agreed, in writing, to submit only to the arbitra-
tion procedure of the Exchange."
46. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.
47. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (holding forum selection clauses
in arbitration agreements are enforceable).
48. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. See McCullagh v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 177 F.3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding
that "the Federal Arbitration Act allows a district court to compel arbitration only in the district in
which it sits"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Lauer, 49 F.3d 323, 327-28 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that where the arbitration agreement contains a forum selection clause, only the district court
in that forum can issue a section 4 order compelling arbitration); Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 418
(7th Cir. 1984) (same as Lauer's holding) overruled on other grounds by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d
873 (7th Cir. 1998); Econo-Car Int'l, Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, Inc., 499 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1974)
(holding that District Court of the Virgin Islands may not compel arbitration in New York, the site
chosen by the parties' arbitration agreement); Lawn v. Franklin, 328 F.Supp. 791, 793 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). Lawn stated that "[a]lthough [section 4] appears to imply that the hearing and proceedings
follow the District in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed, the converse
would seem to follow as well. The proper District within which the petition for such order should be
filed is the District where the 'proceedings' by virtue of the contract of the parties are to take place."
Id.
51. See also Bear, Steams & Co. v. Bennett, 938 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991); Roe v. Gray, 165 F. Supp.
2d 1164 (D. Colo. 2001).
52. Bennett, 938 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991).
53. Id. at 31.
20051
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When a dispute arose, the-customer filed a demand for arbitration with the
AAA in Florida. The broker then filed a petition in the Southern District of New
York to compel arbitration in New York.55 The Bennett court construed the
phrase "in the City of New York" in the AMEX Constitution as a forum selection
clause and held that, "[w]here there is a valid agreement for arbitration, Congress
has directed the district courts to order that arbitration proceed in accordance with
the terms of the agreement. 56
Both the Hammer and Bennett courts held that the court, and not the arbitra-
tor, has the authority to interpret and enforce the forum selection clause. 57 How-
ever, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of arbitration may put these
holdings on shaky ground.
The Supreme Court has long noted that the courts, and not the arbitrator, are
the proper place for determining the "question of arbitrability," i.e., whether the
58parties have agreed to arbitrate. Nevertheless, in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
Livingston,59 the Supreme Court held that after this initial issue of arbitrability has
been determined, "procedural questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on
its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator."
60
The Supreme Court has provided further guidance as to whether a particular
issue of a dispute is a "question of arbitrability." The Court has refused to define
"question of arbitrability" to include "any potentially dispositive gateway ques-
tion," whose answer would "determine whether the underlying controversy will
proceed to arbitration on the merits." 61 Instead, a more limited definition has been
applied to the phrase "question of arbitrability, ' 62 so that it is only applicable,
[in the] narrow circumstance where contracting parties would likely have
expected a court to have decided the gateway matter, where they are not
likely to have thought that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do so,
and, consequently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the court
avoids the risk of forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well
not have agreed to arbitrate.
63
Examples of proper "questions of arbitrability" include disputes over whether
parties are bound by an arbitration agreement, 64 and whether a particular contro-
versy is included under the arbitration agreement. 65 However, as the Livingston
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 32. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000)) (internal quotations omitted).
57. Hammer, 393 F.3d at 1225; Bennett, 938 F.2d at 32.
58. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643 (1986) (noting that
"[u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator"); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v.
Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487, 491 (1972) (holding that it is the responsibility of the court to "de-
termine whether a union and employer have agreed to arbitration").
59. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
60. Id. at 557.
61. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002).
62. Id. (citing First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995)).
63. Id. at 83-84.
64. Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 943-46.
65. AT&T Techs, Inc., 475 U.S. at 651-52.
[Vol. 2
6
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2005, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2005/iss2/10
The Pro-Arbitration Policy
court made clear, a "question of arbitrability" would not exist in circumstances
involving procedural questions arising out of the dispute. 66  Likewise, the Su-
preme Court has stated that a presumption exists that the arbitrator shall decide
"allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. ' ' 67 Also, in Green
68Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, a plurality of the Court found that the phrase
"question of arbitrability," does not include whether, absent s ecific language to
the contrary, an arbitration agreement forbids class arbitration. T
The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA)70 concurs with the Supreme
Court regarding what constitutes a "question of arbitrability." Section 6(c) of the
RUAA states that "[a]n arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to
arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid agreement
to arbitrate is enforceable.' Specifically, the second comment to section 6 states
that section 6(c) is:
intended to incorporate the holdings of the vast majority of state courts
and the law that has developed under the FAA that, in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary, issues of substantive arbitrability, i.e., whether
a dispute is encompassed by an agreement to arbitrate, are for a court to
decide and issues of procedural arbitrability, i.e., whether prerequisites
such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other conditions prece-
dent to an obligation to arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators to
decide.
72
The Supreme Court has not yet reached the direct issue of whether the inter-
pretation and enforcement of a forum selection clause in an arbitration agreement
is a 'question of arbitrability' or a procedural matter that should be decided by the
arbitrator. Hammer and Bennett treated a forum selection clause as a 'question of
arbitrability' and not a procedural matter left for the arbitrator. 73 However, at least
one court has reached the opposite conclusion.
In Richard C. Young & Co. v. Leventhal,74 the First Circuit held that, under
the Supreme Court jurisprudence of Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle and
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., forum selection clauses in arbitration
agreements are procedural matters that must be left to the arbitrator to interpret
66. Livingston, 376 U.S. at 557.
67. Moses, 460 U.S. at 24-25.
68. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
69. Id. at 452. The Court held that the issue of whether the arbitration agreement forbids class arbi-
tration should be for the arbitrator to decide. Id. at 453, 455 (Stevens' concurring in judgment and
dissenting in part stated, "[a]rguably the interpretation of the parties' agreement should have been
made in the first instance by the arbitrator, rather than the court.").
70. The Uniform Arbitration Act was first promulgated in 1955, with the primary purpose of insur-
ing "the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate in the face of oftentimes hostile state law." Prefatory
Note to RUAA, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/billulc/uarba/arbitratl2l3.hun (last visited
Sept. 15, 2005).
71. Uniform Arbitration Act, § 6(c) (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bllIulc/uarba/
arbitratl2l3.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
72. Id. at § 6 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).
73. See supra Part IL, II.
74. 389 F.3d 1(st Cir. 2004).
2005]
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and decide.75 The pertinent language of the forum selection clause in the arbitra-
tion agreement in Leventhal stated that, the "disagreement will be submitted for
arbitration to the American Arbitration Association in Boston, Massachusetts.
76
Although not identical to the language at issue in Hammer, the two provisions are
substantially similar.77 Leventhal differs from Hammer in that the party seeking
arbitration originally filed for arbitration in California, but later submitted the
dispute in the proper location, i.e., Boston, Massachusetts. 78 Before the party
resubmitted its request in Boston, the lower court enjoined further proceedings in
California and interpreted the language of the agreement to only require that the
arbitration request be submitted to the Boston office, and not that arbitration had
to occur in Boston.79
The Leventhal court rejected the lower court's holding, stating instead that fo-
rum selection clauses in arbitration agreements are procedural matters that must
be left to the arbitrator to interpret. 80 Even though the Leventhal court reached
this conclusion, it noted that since the party had since refiled in Boston, the only
question before the court was whether, after the matter was properly refiled, the
arbitration group could then interpret the language so as to allow arbitration in an
area besides Boston.81 It expressly refused to address the issue of whether the
lower court had authority to intervene in the original arbitration filing in Califor-
82
nia.
Additionally, when faced with the issue of whether forum selection clauses
are procedural matters for purposes of the Erie doctrine, the majority of federal
courts have held that federal common law must govern the interpretation and en-
forcement of forum selection clauses because venue, - and thus a forum selection
clause - is a procedural matter and not a substantive issue.
83
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Sterling Financial Investment Group, Inc. v. Hammer,84 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit was faced with the issue of whether the district court could interpret and en-
force a forum selection clause provided in an arbitration agreement by staying
arbitration in Houston, Texas, and compelling arbitration in Boca Raton, Florida.
85
The court affirmed the district court's order because it found the district court
properly exercised jurisdiction under section 4 of the FAA.86
75. Id. at 4.
76. Id. at 2.
77. The agreement in Hammer provided that, "[any disputes between the parties hereto shall be
submitted to binding arbitration before the National Association of Securities Dealers with venue being
in the State of Florida." 393 F.3d at 1224. See supra Part 1I.
78. Leventhal, 389 F.3d at 3.
79. Id. at 2-3.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id.
83. Frediani & Delgreco, S.P.A. v. Gina Imports, Ltd., 870 F.Supp. 217, 219-20 (1994).
84. 393 F.3d 1223 (2004).
85. Id. at 1224-25.
86. ld. at 1226
[Vol. 2
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The Hammer court assumed the arbitration agreement and the forum selection
clause were valid because Hammer never raised that issue before the district
court.87 Although Hammer argued on appeal that the forum selection clause was
invalid due to fraudulent inducement, the court refused to consider this issue be-
cause it was not first raised at the district court leyel.88 In its refusal to consider
this issue, the court stated that "arguments not presented in the district court will
not be considered for the first time on appeal. 89
In its discussion regarding whether the district court had jurisdiction to inter-
pret and enforce the arbitration agreement, the court first noted the relevant por-
tion of section 4 of the FAA:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any
United States district court ... for an order directing that such arbitration
proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. . . . The court
shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in is-
sue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to ar-
bitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and
proceedings, under such agreement, shall be within the district in which
the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed.9°
The court then reasoned that, based on the plain language of section 4 of the
FAA, a court may review an arbitration proceeding before it has concluded. 91
Because of the plain language of section 4, the court found that a federal district
court "has jurisdiction to enforce a forum selection clause in a valid arbitration
agreement that has been disregarded by the arbitrators. 92 In so holding, the court
implicitly found that the interpretation and enforcement of a forum selection
clause is an issue of substantive arbitrability.
93
V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court has long recognized that it is within the sole province of
the court to determine 'questions of arbitrability'( i.e., whether the parties agreed
to arbitrate). 94 However, procedural questions that arise out of the arbitrable issue
itself (the underlying dispute) and that have some affect on the final disposition of
the dispute should be left to the arbitrator.95 In distinguishing the two different
87. Id. at 1225.
88. Id. at 1226.
89. Id. (citing Mills v. Singletary, 63 F.3d 999, 1008 n.l I (1 th Cir. 1988)).
90. Id. at 1225 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4) (emphasis added by court).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, the Hammer court's decision must assume that the
interpretation of a forum selection clause is a substantive issue of arbitrability, otherwise it is contrary
the express holdings of the Supreme Court as evidenced in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle. See supra part II.
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circumstances, the Court has stated that a 'question of arbitrability' only exists in
the narrow situation where the parties to an arbitration agreement "would likely"
have expected a court, and not an arbitrator, to decide the issue.
96
Additionally, in determining whether an issue is a substantive question for the
court or a procedural one for the arbitrator, courts must keep in mind the federal
policy in favor of arbitration. The Supreme Court has stated that, "as a matter of
federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be re-




The Supreme Court has also held that procedural questions must be left to the
arbitrator in order to avoid both duplication of effort by the courts and arbitrator,
as well as serious delays caused by the "separation of the procedural and substan-
tive elements of a dispute.",98 In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, the Court
noted that there would be cases "in which arbitrability of the subject matter is
unquestioned but a dispute arises over the procedures to be followed..." and that
"in all such cases, [the separation of procedural and substantive elements]...
would produce delay attendant upon judicial proceedings preliminary to arbitra-
tion."99 For these reasons, procedural disputes should not be regarded as "separate
disputes," but must be treated as part of the dispute from which the arbitration
arose.10o
But the Court's definition only goes so far in demarcating what is and is not a
"question of arbitrability." As a result, courts have struggled when faced with the
issue of whether a dispute should be left for the arbitrator or the court to decide.
When most recently faced with this issue, the Supreme Court itself was unable to
reach a majority and instead produced a plurality opinion in Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle. 10 1 The lower courts have split as to the specific issue of whether
a forum selection clause in an arbitration agreement is a procedural question for
the arbitrator or a 'question of arbitrability' to be determined by the court.1
0 2
The Hammer court relied on Bear, Steams & Co., Inc, v. Bennett'°3 for the
proposition that a court may interpret and enforce a forum selection clause.
1 4
However, the Bennett case was decided before the Supreme Court stated its more
limited definition of a 'question of arbitrability' in Howsam v. Dean Witter Rey-
nolds, Inc.'0 5 Additionally, the Bennett court never specifically addressed whether
the interpretation of a forum selection clause was a procedural or substantive issue
of arbitrability. 1° 6 Rather, the court in Bennett focused on whether forum selec-
tion clauses were valid and enforceable in arbitration agreements and assumed
96. See AT&T, supra note 59, at 651-52.
97. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
98. Livingston, 376 U.S. at 543 (1964).
99. Id. at 558.
100. Id. at 559.
101. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
102. See supra part II.
103. 938 F.2d 31 (2nd Cir. 1991).
104. Hammer, 393 F.3d at 1225.
105. The Bennett case was decided in 1991, whereas the Supreme Court did not state its limiting
definition of when a 'question of arbitrabiltiy' existed until 2002 in Howsam. (See Bennett, 938 F.2d
31. See also Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
106. See Bennett, 938 F.2d 31.
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that the issue of interpretation was properly before it. 0 7 Similarly, the Hammer
court also failed to expressly address this issue.
10 8
The one court that has addressed the issue of whether a court may interpret a
forum selection clause in an arbitration agreement, Richard C. Young & Co., v.
Leventhal,'°9 found that a dispute over the interpretation of a forum selection
clause was a procedural question for the arbitrator to decide, and not the court. I"0
In reaching its holding, the Leventhal court did take into account the Supreme
Court's most recent holdings on the issue."' When taken collectively, the Su-
preme Court's current jurisprudence concerning 'questions of arbitrability,' the
federal policy of solving issues in favor of arbitration, and the fact that the major-
ity of federal courts have found forum selection clauses to be procedural issues for
purposes of Erie analysis," 2 indicate that the Leventhal court was correct in its
holding.
However, the Leventhal court did not address the issue of whether the court
may enforce a forum selection clause." 3 It seems likely that a court following
Leventhal's analysis would also hold that the court has no power to enforce a fo-
rum selection clause in an arbitration agreement, since a precondition to enforcing
an agreement is being able to interpret that agreement so that the court knows
what it is enforcing and how to go about that enforcement.
The question then becomes: is such a limitation on a court's interpretation
and enforcement powers what Congress intended when it set forth section 4 of the
FAA, which states that "[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or
refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may peti-
tion any United States district court... for an order directing that such arbitration
proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement."" 4 Additionally, the court
must issue this order upon a finding that a valid arbitration agreement was entered
into and there has been a "default in proceeding thereunder."" 5 By providing that
the court must issue "an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the man-
ner provided for in... [the] agreement," Congress implies that the court shall have
at least some limited powers to interpret the agreement. If the court has no
power to interpret the agreement, then it has no means of knowing what exactly
the "manner provided for" in the agreement is. If this proposition is true, the Lev-
enthal holding, by removing the district court's power to hear the issue, serves to
eviscerate the FAA's mandate that district courts shall issue an order to the parties
requiring arbitration in according to the terms of the agreement. By removing the
court's power to hear the issue of whether a forum selection in an arbitration
107. Id. at 32.
108. See Hammer, 393 F.3d 1223.
109. 389 F.3d 1(st Cir. 2004).
110. Id. at 4-5.
111. Id. at 4 (discussing the holdings of Howsam v. Dean Witer Reynolds, Inc. and Green Tree Fi-
nancial Corp. v. Bazzle in reaching its conclusion that the interpretation and enforcement of forum
selection clauses is a procedural question left to the arbitrator).
112. See supra part III for discussion of these issues.
113. Leventhal, 389 F.3d at 5. The court reserved for consideration in a future case whether a District
Court has authority to intervene to address whether a party has filed an arbitration proceeding in an
incorrect venue.
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agreement is being properly followed, the court becomes unable to issue an order
requiring the parties to arbitrate in accordance with the terms of the agreement
Of course, once a district court is stripped of the power to interpret a forum
selection clause, an important issue is raised; namely, what recourse will a party
have if an arbitrator decides to ignore the forum selection clause in an arbitration
agreement? Because arbitrations are only subject to judicial review in very lim-
ited circumstances, the answer is most likely that the party will have no recourse.
This means that, in such situations, parties will be denied the forum selection pro-
visions that they bargained for and included in their contracts."
6
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence seems to indicate that the Hammer court
wrongly decided the issue before it, and that the correct approach was exemplified
by the Leventhal court. However, it is doubtful that such a holding is really in
accordance with the FAA. Thus, although the Hammer court's holding that a
district court has power to interpret and enforce a forum selection clause is proba-
bly incorrect under the current Supreme Court jurisprudence, it is far more in
keeping with the language of section 4 of the FAA and Congress' intent than is
the alternative holding exemplified by the Leventhal court.
LANCE ROSKENS
116. Every federal circuit has determined that in cases where there is no specifically applicable statu-
tory language, the proper standard of judicial review of an arbitrator's decision on the issue of whether
the parties agreed to arbitrate is whether the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. Marcus Mungi-
oli, Comment, The Manifest Disregard Of The Law Standard: A Vehicle For Modernization Of The
Federal Arbitration Act, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1079, 1080 (2000). The Supreme Court, in First Options
v. Kaplan, stated that the "standard of review applied to an arbitrator's decision about arbitrability is a
narrow one" and that the court will set aside an arbitrator's decision only in "very narrow circum-
stances." 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995). If the court finds that the issue was one the parties had agreed to
arbitrate, then the arbitrator's decision is given substantial deference. Id. at 943. This of course leads
us back to the original inquiry the court faces when asked to enforce an arbitration agreement under § 4
of the FAA, the issue of determining whether a matter is a 'question of arbitrability,' (i.e., whether the
parties intended to have it determined by the arbitrator). If the court makes this initial determination
when asked to enforce an arbitration agreement, it is hard to see how the court can later find, in its
review of an arbitrator's decision, that the parties had not intended to arbitrate that particular issue.
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